Annulment of Vows: Man’s Right or Woman’s Plight?
Parashat Matot opens with a set of laws related to vows and oaths. A particularly striking feature of this passage is the introductory verse:
וַיְדַבֵּר מֹשֶׁה אֶל־רָאשֵׁי הַמַּטּוֹת לִבְנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל לֵאמֹר זֶה הַדָּבָר אֲשֶׁר צִוָּה ה': (במדבר ל:ב)
The standard formula of the Torah for introducing a legal section is ‘God spoke to Moshe, saying’, with occasional minor variation. In this passage, however, the direct command to Moshe from God is entirely absent from the text. We only hear indirectly about God’s command from Moshe’s directive to the tribal chiefs.
The Rashbam notes how he was once asked about this point:
שאלתי באניוב בכרך לושדון: לפי הפשט, היכן מצינו שום פרשה שמתחלת כן? שלא נאמר למעלה: וידבר ה' אל משה לאמר איש כי ידר וגו׳, והיאך מתחלת הפרשה בדבורו של משה שאין מפורש לו מפי הגבורה?
The Rashbam’s phraseology is somewhat imprecise as the format used in our passage is not wholly unprecedented. The Ramban makes a passing reference to two other occasions where God’s command is relayed only through the word of Moshe (both of which will be discussed further below).[1] In any event, against the backdrop of hundreds of commands which are recorded with direct speech of God, the challenge posed is a serious one and the rare exceptions warrant our attention.
Alongside the absence of the direct command, we should also note the use of the term zeh ha-davar. This is the same formula used in the other few instances in which God’s command is recorded only through reported speech as opposed to direct speech, however its contribution needs to be understood.
One might argue that the two points are interdependent. Where direct speech of God is absent, it is necessary for the Torah (for the reader’s benefit) to reference upfront that this is indeed the word of God. Yet this is not so simple. The phrase zeh ha-davar occurs in nine legal passages across the Torah and some of those instances are in fact preceded by the standard formula ‘God spoke to Moshe saying’:
וַיְדַבֵּר ה' אֶל־מֹשֶׁה לֵּאמֹר׃ דַּבֵּר אֶל־אַהֲרֹן וְאֶל־בָּנָיו וְאֶל כָּל־בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל וְאָמַרְתָּ אֲלֵיהֶם זֶה הַדָּבָר אֲשֶׁר־צִוָּה ה' לֵאמֹר׃ (ויקרא י"ז:ב)
These and other such examples, suggest the zeh ha-davar phrase has a connotation which is not simply to compensate for the omission of God’s direct command.
For this generation only
The Sages considered the zeh ha-davar phrase to be indicative of an exceptional/one-off directive:
א"ר שמעון ב"ג לא היו ימים טובים לישראל כחמשה עשר באב וכיוה"כ: בשלמא יום הכפורים משום דאית ביה סליחה ומחילה יום שניתנו בו לוחות האחרונות אלא ט"ו באב מאי היא? אמר רב יהודה אמר שמואל יום שהותרו שבטים לבוא זה בזה. מאי דרוש? זה הדבר (במדבר לו, ו) דבר זה לא יהא נוהג אלא בדור זה.(תענית ל:)
The background to the above passage relates to the ban on intertribal marriage introduced in response to an appeal by the tribal chiefs prior to entry to the land. Following the earlier contention of the daughters of Tzelofchad, God had issued a directive which enabled daughters to the father’s estate (where there are no sons). The tribal chiefs countered that the new law posed a threat to their territorial integrity. If an ing daughter ended up marrying someone from outside their own tribe, the ownership of the land would transfer to the husband’s tribe upon her death. God acknowledged their appeal and instructed for inheriting daughters to marry within their tribe to prevent the transfer of tribal territory.
The compromise meant that on the one hand, women could inherit land in the absence of male heirs, and on the other hand, it ensured that the allocated territories would remain within the respective tribe. Notwithstanding the happy ending, over time, the ban on intertribal became perceived as onerous and divisive. Eventually the Sages ‘resolved’ the problem by arriving at a consensus that the original prohibition was only intended for the first generation.[2] They justified their position based on the above derasha of zeh ha-davar. The day intertribal marriage became permissible was institutionalised as a day of national celebration:
At first glance, the basis for the derasha seems far-fetched. In the words of R’ Eliezer Berkowitz:
Unquestionably, such a reinterpretation of the words zeh ha-davar is extremely weak. We assume that the rule arose from the experience of the people. In actual practice, it became impossible to maintain the marital separation between the twelve tribes. Gradually, all the other laws of inheritance were adjusted either to practical requirements or in keeping with the restored female dignity in the society.[3]
Regardless of the change in historical circumstances which may have motivated the reinterpretation, I believe the derasha itself is in fact well-grounded and demonstrates remarkable sensitivity to the text.
As mentioned before, the phrase appears in nine different legal passages. A review of all these cases demonstrates that each relates to an exceptional circumstance of one sort or another. We will briefly survey the first seven and then separately consider the last two cases – the ban on intertribal marriage and annulment of vows[4] - with an eye to addressing our opening questions.
1) Collection of the manna:
זֶה הַדָּבָר אֲשֶׁר צִוָּה ה’ לִקְטוּ מִמֶּנּוּ אִישׁ לְפִי אָכְלוֹ עֹמֶר לַגֻּלְגֹּלֶת מִסְפַּר נַפְשֹׁתֵיכֶם אִישׁ לַאֲשֶׁר בְּאָהֳלוֹ תִּקָּחוּ׃ (שמות ט"ז:ט"ז)
2) Storage of one portion of manna as safekeeping for future generations:
וַיֹּאמֶר מֹשֶׁה זֶה הַדָּבָר אֲשֶׁר צִוָּה ה’ מְלֹא הָעֹמֶר מִמֶּנּוּ לְמִשְׁמֶרֶת לְדֹרֹתֵיכֶם לְמַעַן יִרְאוּ אֶת־הַלֶּחֶם אֲשֶׁר הֶאֱכַלְתִּי אֶתְכֶם בַּמִּדְבָּר בְּהוֹצִיאִי אֶתְכֶם מֵאֶרֶץ מִצְרָיִם׃ (שמות ט"ז:ל"ב)
3) God’s instructions for the 7-day inauguration of the Kohanim and the Mishkan:
וְזֶה הַדָּבָר אֲשֶׁר־תַּעֲשֶׂה לָהֶם לְקַדֵּשׁ אֹתָם לְכַהֵן לִי לְקַח פַּר אֶחָד בֶּן־בָּקָר וְאֵילִם שְׁנַיִם תְּמִימִם׃ (שמות כ"ט:א)
4) Donation of material for the building of the Mishkan:
וַיֹּאמֶר מֹשֶׁה אֶל־כָּל־עֲדַת בְּנֵי־יִשְׂרָאֵל לֵאמֹר זֶה הַדָּבָר אֲשֶׁר־צִוָּה ה’ לֵאמֹר׃ קְחוּ מֵאִתְּכֶם תְּרוּמָה לַה’ כֹּל נְדִיב לִבּוֹ יְבִיאֶהָ אֵת תְּרוּמַת ה’ זָהָב וָכֶסֶף וּנְחֹשֶׁת׃ (שמות ל"ה:ד-ה)
5) Moshe’s inauguration of the Kohanim and the Mishkan:
וַיֹּאמֶר מֹשֶׁה אֶל־הָעֵדָה זֶה הַדָּבָר אֲשֶׁר־צִוָּה ה’ לַעֲשׂוֹת׃ וַיַּקְרֵב מֹשֶׁה אֶת־אַהֲרֹן וְאֶת־בָּנָיו וַיִּרְחַץ אֹתָם בַּמָּיִם׃ (ויקרא ח:ה-ו)
6) Special instruction for the eighth day ceremony:
וַיֹּאמֶר מֹשֶׁה זֶה הַדָּבָר אֲשֶׁר־צִוָּה ה’ תַּעֲשׂוּ וְיֵרָא אֲלֵיכֶם כְּבוֹד ה’׃ (ויקרא ט:ו)
7) Shechitat Chutz / Besar Ta’avah:
דַּבֵּר אֶל־אַהֲרֹן וְאֶל־בָּנָיו וְאֶל כָּל־בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל וְאָמַרְתָּ אֲלֵיהֶם זֶה הַדָּבָר אֲשֶׁר־צִוָּה ה’ לֵאמֹר׃ אִישׁ אִישׁ מִבֵּית יִשְׂרָאֵל אֲשֶׁר יִשְׁחַט שׁוֹר אוֹ־כֶשֶׂב אוֹ־עֵז בַּמַּחֲנֶה אוֹ אֲשֶׁר יִשְׁחַט מִחוּץ לַמַּחֲנֶה׃ וְאֶל־פֶּתַח אֹהֶל מוֹעֵד לֹא הֱבִיאוֹ לְהַקְרִיב קָרְבָּן לַה’ לִפְנֵי מִשְׁכַּן ה’ דָּם יֵחָשֵׁב לָאִישׁ הַהוּא דָּם שָׁפָךְ וְנִכְרַת הָאִישׁ הַהוּא מִקֶּרֶב עַמּוֹ׃ (ויקרא י"ז:ב)
Whilst the one-off nature of the first six cases is self-evident, this seventh case requires some elaboration. According to R’ Akiva, the above verse provides an injunction against slaughtering sacred meat outside the Mishkan periphery (shechitat chutz). Interpreting the verse in this way would pose a potential challenge to the suggestion that zeh ha-davar implies a one-off instruction, as the principle of shechitat chutz is a perpetual command as it applies equally to the Beit HaMikdash as to the Mishkan. Implicitly working within the view of R’ Akiva, the Talmud is forced to creatively assign a new function to zeh ha-davar in the specific context of this passage.
If we alternatively consider the view of R’ Yishmael (which the Talmud does not), then the ride is much smoother. R’ Yishmael understood the above verse to be dealing with besar ta’avah meaning that temporarily, during the wilderness period, there was an injunction against eating non-sacred chullin meat altogether (any consumption of meat had to be in a sacrificial context). This restriction was then removed upon entry into the land (see Deut. 12:20-21). Within R’ Yishmael at least, the passage is indeed limited to the wilderness period and therefore perfectly aligned with the suggestion that zeh ha-davar alludes to an exceptional law. For reasons which go beyond the scope of this article, in terms of peshat, the flow of the passage in general is a better fit for R’ Yishmael than R’ Akiva (see e.g. Ramban).[5]
Intertribal marriage
Let's now reconsider the ban on intertribal marriage in its wider context:
זֶה הַדָּבָר אֲשֶׁר־צִוָּה ה’ לִבְנוֹת צְלָפְחָד לֵאמֹר לַטּוֹב בְּעֵינֵיהֶם תִּהְיֶינָה לְנָשִׁים אַךְ לְמִשְׁפַּחַת מַטֵּה אֲבִיהֶם תִּהְיֶינָה לְנָשִׁים׃ (ויקרא ל"ו:ו)
Aside from the derasha of zeh ha-davar itself, there is other supporting evidence that this injunction was intended to have a limited term. Whilst not stated explicitly, it seems obvious that the ban on intertribal marriage was a concession to existing social structures and not an ideal. First, it is important to recall the fact that the ban on intertribal marriage was enacted as a response to the tribal chiefs rather than God’s own initiative. This suggests there was actually no fundamental need to maintain the tribal integrity after entry into the land. Second, the omission of the direct command from God (in contrast to the response to the daughters of Tzelofchad) may allude to a non-ideal compromise. Finally, and most importantly, tribal unification and consolidation was surely an expected and desirable outcome of nationhood. This can be seen in sefer Devarim which, looking to the future of the nation in the land, marginalises the tribal unit in favour of political and religious centralisation. Point in fact, the internal tensions recurring throughout Tanach were derived mostly from tribal competition and a constant hindrance to national unity.
As the tribal structure gradually disintegrated the necessity of the injunction was no longer required and became an unwanted barrier to unity. However, the potential tool for rescinding the injunction still had to be unlocked. The key – being the derasha of zeh ha-davar - was naturally only discovered/accepted once the value of national unity triumphed over the countervalue of tribal loyalty, thus undoing the very mindset which triggered the initial injunction. Note that had it been written explicitly that the term was limited to one generation, it would have failed in its objective of allaying the concerns of the tribal chiefs.[6]
Annulment of vows in the context of the patriarchal society
Returning full circle to the passage concerning vows, it seems that here too the zeh ha-davar phrase alludes to the exceptional nature of the laws. Just as the law restricting intertribal marriage was a concession to the tribal hegemony, so too the set of laws which enable a husband/father to annul the vows of his wife/daughter was necessary to accommodate the prevailing patriarchal structure. This reading is supported by other textual clues.
The passage starts off by emphasising the utmost seriousness of a vow:
אִישׁ כִּי־יִדֹּר נֶדֶר לַה’ אוֹ־הִשָּׁבַע שְׁבֻעָה לֶאְסֹר אִסָּר עַל־נַפְשׁוֹ לֹא יַחֵל דְּבָרוֹ כְּכָל־הַיֹּצֵא מִפִּיו יַעֲשֶׂה: (במדבר ל:ג)
The focus of the law, however, is not so much on the basic requirement that they must be adhered to, but to describe the circumstances when they may be annulled based on relationship considerations. That this is the main purpose of the passage is clear from the concluding verse:
אֵלֶּה הַחֻקִּים אֲשֶׁר צִוָּה ה' אֶת־מֹשֶׁה בֵּין אִישׁ לְאִשְׁתּוֹ בֵּין־אָב לְבִתּוֹ בִּנְעֻרֶיהָ בֵּית אָבִיהָ: (במדבר ל"א:י"ז)
With this in mind, let’s consider the first case of annulment:
וְאִם־הֵנִיא אָבִיהָ אֹתָהּ בְּיוֹם שָׁמְעוֹ כָּל־נְדָרֶיהָ וֶאֱסָרֶיהָ אֲשֶׁר־אָסְרָה עַל־נַפְשָׁהּ לֹא יָקוּם וַה’ יִסְלַח־לָהּ כִּי־הֵנִיא אָבִיהָ אֹתָהּ׃ (במדבר ל:ד-ו)
The passage does not condition the vow on the father’s formal acceptance. Nor does it actively prescribe the right of the father to annul the vows. It says that if (ve-im) he 'prevents her' (הניא אביה אותה) from keeping her vow then God will forgive her for violating it.[7] The straightforward meaning of the verse refers to a circumstance where he compels her to break her vow. At this point he does not seem to be engaging a formal annulment procedure.[8] The structure of the verse is that of a conditional clause followed by an operative clause. This formula is recognisable from other case law in the Torah – if someone does such and such (situation)… then such and such is the consequence (operative law). In the situation at hand, the girl is faced with a predicament which the Torah seeks to resolve. Reminiscent of the way God allows his name to be blotted out in the Sotah water to restore marital harmony, the girl is allowed to violate her vow (thereby desecrating the name of God) in order to protect her and the relationship with her father/husband.[9] To this end, she may follow the directive of her father/husband instead of fulfilling her commitment to God.
A further proof for this reading is the expression ‘she bears no sin’. The phrase is repeated in all three cases where the annulment is effective. If the intent was to assign a right to the father/husband to annul the vows one would have expected the verse to say she is ‘freed from her oath/vows’ (e.g. Gen. 24:8). The fact that she requires forgiveness suggests we are not dealing with an ideal situation but an ex post facto solution to a difficult situation.[10]
Admittedly, formalising the law which permits her to break her vow inevitably embeds a legal right of the father/husband to do so in the first place. Once reconfigured as such, the father/husband need not actively force her to break her vow as he can exercise his power of annulment through verbal means. This may explain the reason why the subsequent passages outlining the situation in which she is allowed to break her vow gradually introduce the concept of annulment (הפרה) into the text which eventually replaces the coercive action (הניא) altogether (itself a positive moral development). Yet we must remain sensitive to the original context which was engaging a real-life problem borne out of a prevailing norm, but not to endorse the norm itself.
Perhaps the strongest proof is in the penultimate verse of the passage:
וְאִם־הָפֵר יָפֵר אֹתָם אַחֲרֵי שָׁמְעוֹ וְנָשָׂא אֶת־עֲוֺנָהּ׃ (במדבר ל:ט"ז)[11]
If he fails to annul her vow in time, then she is bound to her word. Why does the verse say that he bears her sin? Why is it assumed that she does not fulfil her vow? Various approaches are suggested by the commentators, but I believe the most straightforward, as alluded to by the Ibn Ezra, is that he is compelling her to abide by the invalid annulment. Since we have shown the entire passage comes to address a situation where the dominant male is forcing her to violate her vow, it is reasonable to assume that the same danger looms at the end of the passage in the scenario where the annulment was invalid (as it was not on the same day as hearing of the vow). Furthermore, emphasising that he bears the sin when he compels her to break her vow, will make him less likely to do so in the first place.
In an ideal and equitable society, one would imagine that women have the independence to make and fulfil their vows and the Torah does indeed prompt us in that direction.[12] The laws of annulment are legislated as reactive to a cultural norm (God ‘forgives’ the violation of the vow) and not designed ab initio as a fundamental right of the father/husband. Moreover, by granting fathers/husbands the power over the vows of a daughter/wife, but restricting it to the day they heard it, the control of the male was greatly diminished and a trajectory was set towards greater equality. At the same time, the established views and existing social structure of contemporary society were not disregarded, thus ensuring that positive change is acceptable and harmonious. In short, whilst the Torah's laws are grounded in the present, they are also oriented upwards with idealistic aspirations.[13]
In summary, it can be shown that each of the nine instances where zeh ha-davar introduces a legal passage, the passage deals with an exceptional law. The specific phrase serves to draw special attention to the surprising and extraordinary nature of the law which follows.[14] In the two cases where the law prescribes a ‘necessary evil’ to deal with a prevailing norm (i.e. banning intertribal marriages and permitting vows to be broken), the Torah omits reference to God’s direct command. This may allude to the fact that the law in question presents a concession rather than a Godly ideal.[15]
[1] Later in the parashah there is another example where Elazar relays the command about purification of vessels without the Torah recording any direct speech from God. This case, however, links back to the passage of parah adumah which contains a direct speech of God. On a similar note, there are plenty of examples where Moshe’s speech adds details not referenced in the original direct command from God - but this is different to the matter under consideration.
[2] I assume here the view of R' Aryeh Leib Ginsberg (Sha’agat Aryeh) – against the Rashbam and Tosfot Rid – that the temporary nature of the injunction was derived by the Sages at a much later date (see Gevurot Ari, Ta’anit 30b). As an aside, this view is awkward – if not heretical - for the Rambam who would have enumerated this as one of the negative commandments if he was writing his sefer hamitzvot prior to the derasha being discovered. It would then had to have ‘dropped’ from the 613 list upon discovery that it is not a Mitzvah for all generations (per shoresh 3).
[3] Jewish Women in Time and Torah, Hoboken, N.J, Ktav Pub. House, 1990, available on Sefaria. R’ Baruch Halevi Epstein (Torah Temimah commentary), shares the view that we are dealing with a corroborative derasha rather than a genuinely creative one, but with a radically different conclusion:
ואמנם עם כ"ז לא נתבאר מניין לקחו להם לעיקר ויסוד לבטל מצוה שבתורה, כי בודאי על דיוק לשון זה הדבר לבד קשה לבנות יסוד לבטל מצוה מפורשת בתורה. ויתכן לומר שהיה להם בקבלה דעיקר הצווי מהסבת נחלה היה רק בעת חלוקת הארץ, כדי שיתודע ויתברר חלק כל אחד ואחד, אבל אח"כ לדורות שכבר נתבררו והוגבלו החלקים ונקראו בשם, שוב אין לחוש למקרה הסבת נחלה, ובכ"ז לא בטלו המצוה עד זמן ידוע שראו שא"א להתקיים בלי נשואי תערובת השבטים זב"ז, ועמדו והתירו, ומצאו רמז לזה בתורה את הלשון זה הדבר כמבואר, כך נ"ל.
[4] Interestingly these two parashiot – which lie in close proximity - are the only ones said over to the tribal chiefs and, as we will see, both seek to grapple with the prevailing tribal/patriarchal social structure.
[5] Ramban, Lev. 17:2, concludes as follows:
וזהו דעתו של רבי ישמעאל (חולין טז) בפרשיות הללו ומכאן אמר דמעיקרא איתסר להו בשר תאוה והוא הנאות בכתוב על דרך הפשט
[6] In terms of the theological implications regarding the development of halachah, this is consistent with the likes of R’ A.Y. Kook (Igrot, Letter 90) and R’ Moshe Shmuel Glasner (see Peticha to Dor Revi’i) who - each with their own nuances – appreciated the potential for moral/ethical development to open new vistas of interpretation which could potentially uplift halachah.
[7] In terms of the meaning of הניא, see Rashi’s second explanation in particular (u-peshuto). See also Maharal, Gur Aryeh, regarding Rashi’s first explanation.
[8] The basic principle is preserved by the Rambam (Hil. Nedarim 13:4-6) who understood there to be a concept of bittul of a vow alongside the formalistic hafarah. In the case of the former the demand of the father/husband for the woman to violate her vow automatically terminates it and no verbal formula is required. The Ra’avad heavily critiques the Rambam, but the Rambam’s understanding retains the plain sense of the verses as we have explained them (see also Kesef Mishna).
[9] See note 11
[10] Cf. Rashi and T.B Kiddushin 81b.
[11] There is a striking contrast between this closing verse verse and the closing verse of the Sotah passage. In the Sotah passage, the final verse (Num. 5:31) states:
ונקה האיש מעון והאשה ההיא תשא את עונה
In both passages there is a tension in the relationship between husband and wife (one results from promiscuity, the other from self-denial); both cases there is an act of compulsion (forcing the wife to drink the Sotah water/violate her vow); both cases God allows his name to be erased/desecrated to resolve the tension. In the case of Sotah, however, where she has genuinely broken the trust in the relationship the verse stresses that he bears no sin for having forced her to drink, whereas here the verse stresses that he is responsible for the violation caused by his imposition.
[12] The Sages themselves severely limited the application of the husband’s ability to annul vows to those which directly or indirectly impact on their relationship (i.e. self-denial – inuy nefesh - vows). Rambam (Hil. Nedarim 12:1) rules – contrary to the view of the Sifri - that the same scope limitation does not apply to the father (see Rambam’s responsum #326 where he partly justifies the deviation based on the peshat considerations!).
[13] See R’ Kook, ibid, Letter 89
[14] R’ Yaakov Tzvi Mecklenburg (HaKetav VeHaKabbalah) understands the technical basis for the derasha to be allocating a temporal meaning to the word זה (=כעת).
[15] The other cases of zeh ha-davar which do not open with a direct command require their own local explanations which are beyond the scope of this discussion (note however that #4 and #5 are linked to the direct command which is #3).
