Thursday, 27 June 2024

שלח

Inadvertent Violation of the Entire Torah

The various circumstances in which a 'sin' offering is required were set out in Parashat Vayikra.[1] Our Parashah now appears to add another category:

וְכִי תִשְׁגּוּ וְלֹא תַעֲשׂוּ אֵת כָּל־הַמִּצְוֺת הָאֵלֶּה אֲשֶׁר־דִּבֶּר ה' אֶל־מֹשֶׁה׃ אֵת כָּל־אֲשֶׁר צִוָּה ה' אֲלֵיכֶם בְּיַד־מֹשֶׁה מִן־הַיּוֹם אֲשֶׁר צִוָּה ה' וָהָלְאָה לְדֹרֹתֵיכֶם׃ וְהָיָה אִם מֵעֵינֵי הָעֵדָה נֶעֶשְׂתָה לִשְׁגָגָה וְעָשׂוּ כָל־הָעֵדָה פַּר בֶּן־בָּקָר אֶחָד לְעֹלָה לְרֵיחַ נִיחֹחַ לַה' וּמִנְחָתוֹ וְנִסְכּוֹ כַּמִּשְׁפָּט וּשְׂעִיר־עִזִּים אֶחָד לְחַטָּת׃ (במדבר ט"ו:כב-כד)

At first glance this case appears to be a communal level transgression similar to the one listed in the Vayikra requiring a special bull offering (par he'elem davar):

וְאִם כָּל־עֲדַת יִשְׂרָאֵל יִשְׁגּוּ וְנֶעְלַם דָּבָר מֵעֵינֵי הַקָּהָל וְעָשׂוּ אַחַת מִכָּל־מִצְוֺת ה' אֲשֶׁר לֹא־תֵעָשֶׂינָה וְאָשֵׁמוּ׃ וְנוֹדְעָה הַחַטָּאת אֲשֶׁר חָטְאוּ עָלֶיהָ וְהִקְרִיבוּ הַקָּהָל פַּר בֶּן־בָּקָר לְחַטָּאת וְהֵבִיאוּ אֹתוֹ לִפְנֵי אֹהֶל מוֹעֵד: (ויקרא ד':יג-יד)

Both passages discuss a communal transgression and both refer to the 'eyes' of the congregation. This term is traditionally understood as alluding to the leaders of the people who regarded as the 'eyes' of the people due to their capacity to guide.[2] Though in the context of the Vayikra passage a literal reading of the word me-einei (eyes) is plausible, in the Bamidbar passage it is more awkward.[3] The association of eyes with leadership may be supported by the nearby dialogue between Moshe and Chovav. Moshe entreats Chovav to remain with the Israelites instead of returning home referring to his ability to act as the 'eyes' (i.e. guide) of the people:

וַיֹּאמֶר אַל־נָא תַּעֲזֹב אֹתָנוּ כִּי עַל־כֵּן יָדַעְתָּ חֲנֹתֵנוּ בַּמִּדְבָּר וְהָיִיתָ לָּנוּ לְעֵינָיִם׃ (במדבר י':לא)

In any event, despite the similarities, the composition of the sacrifices is different in each case – in the Vayikra passage a bull is offered as the sin offering, whereas in the Bamidbar passage a he-goat is brought (as well as a bull as a burnt offering). Furthermore, our passage seems to deal with the case where the nation violates all the Mitzvot, whereas the Vayikra passage seems to deal with a singular transgression.

The traditional view – legal error

These discrepancies led Chazal to the view (referenced by Rashi) that our passage deals with a case where the Sanhedrin mistakenly rules that a certain form of idolatry was permitted.[4] Since idolatry amounts to an abrogation of the covenant, the Torah refers to it as a violation of all the Mitzvot:

בַּעֲ"זָ הַכָּתוּב מְדַבֵּר, אוֹ אֵינוֹ אֶלָּא בְאַחַת מִכָּל הַמִּצְוֹת, תַּ"ל את כל המצות האלה — מִצְוָה אַחַת שֶׁהִיא כְּכָל הַמִּצְוֹת, מַה הָעוֹבֵר עַל כָּל הַמִּצְוֹת פּוֹרֵק עֹל וּמֵפֵר בְּרִית וּמְגַלֶּה פָנִים, אַף מִצְוָה זוֹ פּוֹרֵק בָּהּ עֹל וּמֵפֵר בְּרִית וּמְגַלֶּה פָנִים, וְאֵיזוֹ? זוֹ עֲ"זָ (רש"י)

According to this view the cause of the transgression is the same in both passages, being the product of an errant ruling by the Sanhedrin. The differences simply result from the form of transgression (idolatry vs other sins).

The obvious problem is that our immediate passage contains no clear reference to idolatry, and nor do the surrounding passages. If the passage revolves around idolatry, it should have been mentioned explicitly. Another more general problem is why this passage was separated from the Vayikra passage to begin with. The difficulty is particularly acute for the above interpretation which identifies the sin offering of our passage as a variant of the communal sin offering of the Vayikra passage, only restricted to a particular form of transgression (i.e. idolatry).[5]

Incidentally, the perception that the he-goat offering of our passage is a subcategory of the par he'elem davar, despite the distance between the texts, is evidenced by the fact that the Rambam considers them part of the same commandment. In his brief comments in Sefer HaMitzvot (#68) he only references the par he'elem davar and ignores our passage altogether, however it is clear from the Yad Chazakah (Hil. Shgagot 12:1) that he regards the special case of idolatry as a mere modification of the par he'elem davar.[6]  

The Ramban – special status of communal transgression

The Ramban seeks to explain the meaning of our passage without relying on the overly restrictive interpretation that the passage is dealing (exclusively) with idolatry. He suggests that it is possible to contemplate certain scenarios whereby the community 'inadvertently' abandons the entire Torah, or at least most of it:

הפרשה הזו סתומה במשמעה... ולשון הכתוב שלא נוציא אותו מפשוטו ומשמעו יאמר וכי תשגו מכל המצות ותעברו על כל מה שצוה השם לכם ביד משה שלא תעשו דבר מכל מה שצוה אתכם תקריבו הקרבן הזה ולכך לא הזכיר בכאן כאשר יאמר בקרבנות החטא אחת מכל מצות ה' והנה זה כפי משמעו הוא קרבן מומר לכל התורה בשוגג כגון ההולך ונדבק לאחת מן האומות לעשות כהם ולא ירצה להיות בכלל ישראל כלל ויהיה כל זה בשוגג כגון שיהיה ביחיד תינוק שנשבה לבין האומות ובקהל כגון שיחשבו שכבר עבר זמן התורה ולא היתה לדורות עולם או שיאמרו כמו שזכר בספרי (שלח קטו) מפני מה אמר המקום לא שנעשה ונטול שכר אנו לא עושים ולא נוטלין שכר... וכבר אירע לנו כן בעונותינו (כי) בימי מלכי ישראל הרשעים כגון ירבעם ששכחו רוב העם התורה והמצות לגמרי...

The examples the Ramban brings include situations where the masses believe, for one reason or another, that the Torah is no longer applicable, or was otherwise optional in the first place. He notes that these have historical precedent and are not mere hypothetical examples.[7]

According to R' Yoel Bin Nun the remarkable implication of the Ramban's comments is that members of an entire community are, as a general rule, not regarded as willful transgressors.[8] Since people's action typically reflect their social environments, they are automatically deemed inadvertent.[9] This is the apparent meaning of the final verse in our passage:

וְנִסְלַח לְכָל־עֲדַת בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל וְלַגֵּר הַגָּר בְּתוֹכָם כִּי לְכָל־הָעָם בִּשְׁגָגָה׃ (ט"ו:כז)

The verse seemingly asserts the principle that a communal sin is deemed inadvertent and therefore eligible for forgiveness. The rationale for this classification is that the Torah understands very well the dynamics and trappings of social pressure. The tendency to conform impairs or negates independent judgement.[10]

This reading is supported by the structure of the surrounding passages. The next passage deals with inadvertent transgression of an individual, and the following passage deals with the brazen transgressor (be'yad ramah) who sins willfully. The fact that there is no passage which deals with wanton transgression on a communal level is instructive.[11] An individual who openly transgresses in contravention to communal norms is guilty of rebellion. But this mode of rebellion is by nature not applicable to a community. It is precisely because of the contagious nature of transgressive behaviour within a social context, that the Torah is harsh on the individual yet forgiving towards the wider community.

The spies episode as the backdrop to our passage

R' Bin Nun's article was subsequently subject of a critique which, inter aila, argued that the Ramban's intention was never to recast every communal sin as inadvertent.[12] The Ramban's classification assumes that the actions of these groups are reflective of genuine but mistaken beliefs. The transgressions are only regarded as inadvertent if the people are subscribing to a philosophical view which renders their actions permissible.[13] Accordingly, there is no substantive difference between an individual and a community when it comes to determining whether an action is willful or inadvertent.

But this does not quite stand up to scrutiny. The Ramban explains the location of the passage as a result of its close proximity to the spies narrative:

ונכנסה כאן בעבור שהם מרו דבר השם ואמרו נתנה ראש ונשובה מצרימה (במדבר י״ד:ד׳) להיות שם במצרים כאשר היו בראשונה בלא תורה ובלא מצות והנה באה הפרשה להודיעם כי אפילו בע"ז יכפר על השוגגים אבל העושים ביד רמה יכרית אותם וכבר פירשתי

According to the Ramban, our passage contains the root principle which enabled the people to escape annihilation following the spies debacle. There, the individual leaders (i.e. ten of the twelve spies) who caused the mutiny were killed, whilst the wider congregation was forgiven. In that episode the congregation's behaviour was not 'inadvertent' in the conventional sense, yet the Ramban presents it as an application of the principle of our passage (and perhaps even establishes the paradigm).[14]

Reading our passage in light of the spies episode seems to corroborate the Ramban's explanation (as understood above).[15] The fallout following the spies' report was a perfect example of the social contagion which we have suggested justifies the labelling of the transgressors as inadvertent. The spies came back with a negative report and overnight triggered a pandemic of fear which triggered the mutiny.

Furthermore, the premise of our passage is that there is a rejection of all the Mitzvot which, in the context of the spies episode, is expressed through the refusal to enter the land and desire to return to Egypt. This dovetails well with the Ramban's position (Lev. 18:25) that the full significance of the Mitzvot can only be realised inside the land. But even if one demurs whether this is valid on an individual level, it is difficult to dispute its validity on a communal-national level.

The link between the two passages is also borne out by the corresponding language expressing forgiveness:

וְנִסְלַח לְכָל־עֲדַת בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל וְלַגֵּר הַגָּר בְּתוֹכָם כִּי לְכָל־הָעָם בִּשְׁגָגָה׃ (ויקרא ד':יג-יד)

סְלַח־נָא לַעֲוֺן הָעָם הַזֶּה כְּגֹדֶל חַסְדֶּךָ וְכַאֲשֶׁר נָשָׂאתָה לָעָם הַזֶּה מִמִּצְרַיִם וְעַד־הֵנָּה׃ וַיֹּאמֶר ה' סָלַחְתִּי כִּדְבָרֶךָ׃ (במדבר י"ד:יט-כ)

It is noteworthy that as part of the Yom Kippur prayers these two verses are juxtaposed but placed in inverse order. This suggests an acknowledgement by the compilers of the prayers that the later verse provides the underlying rationale for forgiveness in the earlier verse.[16]

Another compelling point which emerges from the Ramban's explanation (but not explicitly mentioned) is the way it resolves a subtle but critical difference in the text of our passage and the Vayikra passage:

 וְאִם כָּל־עֲדַת יִשְׂרָאֵל יִשְׁגּוּ וְנֶעְלַם דָּבָר מֵעֵינֵי הַקָּהָל... (ויקרא ד':יג)

וְהָיָה אִם מֵעֵינֵי הָעֵדָה נֶעֶשְׂתָה לִשְׁגָגָה... (במדבר ט"ו:כב)

As already mentioned, according to the traditional reading, there is no difference in terms of the process leading to the transgression. Both verses speak of an errant legal ruling. However, the key word ne’elam of the first passage is 'missing' in our verse. This alone suggests the subject matter of our verse is not a legal omission. A more precise reading suggests that the violation in our passage was actually instigated by the leaders rather than enabled by their ignorance of the law.

This once again matches the narrative of the spies in which the leaders (the spies were tribal leaders, see Num 13:3) directly caused the mass mutiny. Their influential positions make them directly responsible for the impact of their actions, whereas the followers - the congregation - receive mitigation.

Relationship with the tzitzit passage

The reference to the leaders as the 'eyes of the congregation' is also notable for its touchpoint with the spies who led people astray based on what their 'eyes' saw:

וּרְאִיתֶם אֶת־הָאָרֶץ מַה־הִוא וְאֶת־הָעָם הַיֹּשֵׁב עָלֶיהָ הֶחָזָק הוּא הֲרָפֶה הַמְעַט הוּא אִם־רָב... וַיַּעֲלוּ וַיָּתֻרוּ אֶת־הָאָרֶץ... וְשָׁם רָאִינוּ אֶת־הַנְּפִילִים בְּנֵי עֲנָק מִן־הַנְּפִלִים וַנְּהִי בְעֵינֵינוּ כַּחֲגָבִים וְכֵן הָיִינוּ בְּעֵינֵיהֶם׃ (במדבר י"ג)

This reference is particularly significant as it connects with the directive at the end of the Parashah (within the tzitzit passage) that one should not be led astray by one's eyes.

וְהָיָה לָכֶם לְצִיצִת וּרְאִיתֶם אֹתוֹ וּזְכַרְתֶּם אֶת־כָּל־מִצְוֺת ה' וַעֲשִׂיתֶם אֹתָם וְלֹא־תָתֻרוּ אַחֲרֵי לְבַבְכֶם וְאַחֲרֵי עֵינֵיכֶם אֲשֶׁר־אַתֶּם זֹנִים אַחֲרֵיהֶם׃ (במדבר ט"ו:לט)

 Much has been written on the connection between the tzitzit passage and the episode of the spies,[17] but less so on the interaction between the tzitzit passage and our passage dealing with the inadvertent communal transgression. Aside from the role of the eyes in both passages, both contain a reference to the 'performance' – or lack thereof - of 'all the mitzvot'. In the entire Torah there is only one other such reference (as part of the Tochakha - Lev. 26:14) with one further reference in the rest of Tanakh (1 Chron. 28:8). In our passage, an offering is brought for the collective straying after the 'eyes of the congregation', whereas in the tzitzit passage the warning is not to stray after one's eyes.

Whilst our passage provides mitigation for the herd-like behaviour of the community (as evidenced in the episode of the spies), this should not be confused with acceptance. The very cause for mitigation highlights the power and potential corruption of social influences. This is where the Mitzvah of tzitzit comes in. The Mitzvah of tzitzit seeks to empower individuals to develop moral fortitude and courage to withstand external pressures. The details of how this is specifically achieved by the tzitzit is beyond the scope of this discussion. For our purposes, we will simply note that the tzitzit serves as a constant presence on the garments of the person which is an expression of a person's identity. The purple-blue of the tekhelet in particular was associated with royalty reminding the wearer of their lofty status as a member of the 'kingdom of priests'. Most dramatically, the tzitzit recalls the tzitz – the most holy of the exclusive garments worn by the Kohen Gadol.[18]

Through the continuous reminder provided by the tzitzit of the individual's noble standing before God, everyone is enjoined to exercise their personal autonomy and not blindly follow the 'eyes' of the leaders and the always-fickle zeitgeist.[19]

Why a he-goat?

Perhaps this also explains the particular form of the offering in our passage which differs from the bull offering of the Vayikra passage. The animal used as a 'sin' offering in our passage is a he-goat which in Hebrew is a seir-izzim. The word עז means bold which characterises the behaviour of a goat. Goats have a curious and bold nature (especially adult male goats) exemplified by their tendency to climb and explore. This is marked contrast to a sheep, who tend to be more timid and flock-oriented.

This difference in behavior makes goats natural leaders in a mixed herd. I found this out for myself when I participated in a corporate event at Ne'ot Kedumim where one of the tasks required us to move a mixture of sheep and goats from location A to B. The key to the successful completion of the task, we soon realised, was to attract the goats and then the sheep would follow.

The Talmud also utilises the goat-leader metaphor in noting that when God is angry at the herd, he blinds the goats:

מַאי מַשְׁכּוּכִית?...רַבִּי יַעֲקֹב אוֹמֵר: עִיזָּא דְּאָזְלָא בְּרֵישׁ עֶדְרָא – כְּדִדְרַשׁ הַהוּא גָּלִילָאָה עֲלֵיהּ דְּרַב חִסְדָּא: כַּד רָגֵיז רָעֲיָא עַל עָנָא, עָבֵיד לְנַגָּדָא סַמְוָתָא. (בבלי בבא קמא נב.)

 The appropriate offering in our passage is therefore the se’ir izzim. But here too there may be yet another allusion to the failure of the spies whose objection to entering the land boiled down to the words:

אֶפֶס כִּי־עַז הָעָם (במדבר י"ג:כח)

In this dramatic turn in their speech, the spies identified the very attribute they themselves were lacking. Physical and spiritual life in the land necessitates courage and fortitude. The nation will be ready to enter only once the likes of Pinchas emerge from the new generation – someone who can boldly stand up to evil and moral decay even whilst the actual leaders are immobilised.




[1] Although 'sin' offering is not the correct translation of Chatat (which has a wider meaning), I have used it here specifically to describe the scenarios where the Chatat is brought as a result of a sin.

[2] Traditionally this is understood to specifically refer to the Sanhedrin who were the ultimate legal authority. I will assume in this article the term refers to leadership in a broader sense. Interestingly, the proofs from the Midrash Halakha (and most of the classic commentators) focus on the opening part of the verse - kol adat yisra'el – which is interpreted as a strand of leadership (i.e. the Sanhedrin) rather than the community at large. See commentary of R' David Zvi Hoffman for an attempted defence of this interpretation. To me it seems that the main support for equating eyes with leadership comes from the Chovav passage as discussed above. For reasons discussed later, the wider context also suggests that the question of leadership is central to our passage.

[3] Regarding the Vayikra passage, Shadal notes:

כל עדת ישראל: כמשמעו, כל הקהל; וזה אמנם לא יהיה רק בשגגת המנהיגים והשופטים, אבל הכתוב לא הזכיר הסנהדרין ולא הזכיר כלל הוראת ב"ד, ולפי הפשט אחד הוא שתהיה השגגה בעבור הוראת ב"ד, או הוראת הכהן הגדול או המלך, או שתהיה ללא מורֶה.

Regarding the Bamidbar passage, the NJPS translates as follows: 'if this was done unwittingly, through the inadvertence of the community'. In doing so, they have effectively ignored the word me-einei.

[4] Rashi and Ramban seem to differ as to the main motivation for Chazal's interpolation of idolatry into the passage.

[5] The Talmud (TB Horiyot 8a) transfers laws from one passage to the other by utilising a gezerah shavah based on the common denominator of me-einei.

[6] Interestingly the Rambam groups three out of the four Chatat categories of the Vayikra passage as one Mitzvah (#69) and only counts the case of the par he'elem davar separately. However, the process for offering the Chatat (as distinct from the requirement to bring one) is counted as one Mitzvah for all the variations (see #64).

[7] Characteristically, the Ramban does not consider his peshat explanation and that of the Midrash Halakha to be mutually exclusive.

[8] Link to article here

[9] R' Bin Nun applies this category to non-religious Jews of our time which he argues is more accurate and preferable (emotionally and halakhically) to the frequently applied tinok she-nishba (which the Ramban also references here).

[10] The Netziv, without diverging from Chazal's interpretation, similarly noted the herd mentality as the central motif of our passage:

ונסלח לכל עדת בני ישראל וגו׳ כי לכל העם בשגגה. שאינו דומה יחיד העובד ע״ז דאז ודאי יש לחקור אם היה בשוגג ומתכפר בקרבן או במזיד. משא״כ כל העם השאטים אחרי מנהליהם מסתמא רוב העם בשגגה. דגופא בתר רישא אזיל. והכל הולך אחר הרוב ורובו ככולו. וזהו שמסיים הכתוב כי לכל העם בשגגה. זהו פשט המקרא. והדרשה בספרי ע״ז תדרש: (העמק דבר, ט:ו:כו)

[11] The Rambam references the brazen sinner (one who acts be'yad ramah) in a number of places but always in the context of an individual.

[12] See R' Michael Abraham's critique here. See response by R' Bin Nun here.   

[13] See the notes of R' Chavel on the Ramban citing the "Dvirei Sha'ul" of R' Yosef Sha'ul Nathansohn (1808–1875) who makes this argument. If this were correct, it would place the Ramban at odds with the Rambam's apparent view that "nebech apikorus is oich an apikorus".

[14] Another point to note is that when the Ramban refers to the historical precedents, he doesn't bother to determine the particular weltanschauung which led to the people abandoning the Torah.

[15] Even if we have read too much into the Ramban, I would like to submit this as peshat of our passage.

[16] We can perhaps explain another seeming anomaly. For some reason the instruction in our passage is embedded in the same speech as the law of Challah. The law of Challah is clearly located here since it relates to the entry into the land. This perhaps hints that the question of entry into the land also forms the backdrop to our passage.

[17] See Jacob Milgrom, The JPS Torah Commentary: Numbers (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1990) pp. 410-414. 

[18] Engraved on the tzitz of the Kohen Gadol were the words 'kodesh la-shem' which with the function of the tzitzit: 've-he-yitem kedoshim l'elokeikhem'. Both garments also had a tekhelet cord attached. Another commonality with the priesthood in general is that both the garments of the priests and the tzitzit contain, or may contain, an otherwise prohibited combination of wool and linen. In the case of the priestly garments this is explicit, in the case of tzitzit it is implicit (see TB Menachot 39b).

[19] There is of course a danger that this mindset may lead to anarchy. It is not coincidental that the very next section in the Torah presents the episode of Korach who argued against the leadership and priestly hierarchy on the basis that 'all the congregation is holy', a proposition which certainly resonates with the tzitzit passage (see Midrash Tanchuma, Korach 4).


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